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But to go to school in a summer morn 
Oh! it drives all joy away; 
Under a cruel eye outworn, 
The little ones spend the day, 
In sighing and dismay. 
WILLIAM BLAKE' 
I. Introduction 
EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS are written or authorized certificates 
issued by a unit of government. They provide parents with the 
authorization to pay for their child's education at the school of 
their choice. Under a voucher system, parents choose schools 
according to their beliefs about the type of education they desire 
for their child and their perception of an individual school's qual- 
ity. The school redeems the voucher by sending or returning it to 
the government unit in return for a predetermined dollar amount. 
Under this system, government support of education flows only to 
those schools to which parents have decided to send their ~h i ld ren .~  
The heart of the criticism of the existing educational system is 
the feeling that public schools no longer meet the needs of society, 
educational bureaucracies account to no one, parents have little 
say or choice in the educational options for their children, there is 
little diversity in public schools, and the public school establish- 
1. The School Boy, in THE POETRY AND PROSE OF WILLIAM BLAKE (Erdman ed. 
1965). 
2. C. MCGUIRE, DUCATIONAL VOUCHERS 1 (June 19, 1979) (report prepared 
for the New York State Task Force on Equity and Excellence in Education). 
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ment has resisted any attempts at reform or distributing data that 
could be used to challenge the present system.' 
The breadth of disquiet with the public schools is demonstrated 
by the exodus of whites from public schools, the increasing retreat 
of the middle class to private schools, and a long-term trend of 
middle class black and white movement to the  suburb^.^ Dis- 
satisfaction with education is exemplified by attempts to place a 
cap on public expenditures, the Proposition 13 mentality, the 
declining enrollment and support for public school systems and 
school budgets, and the turmoil of court-ordered integration. 
These factors have led to a search for alternatives to the existing 
public educational system and a serious interest in the voucher 
alternative. 
Although vouchers have been used only in a few instances, such 
as providing educational possibilities for handicapped students, 
the educational voucher is not a new idea.5 Its underlying philo- 
sophical basis is the advantage of a free-market economy and 
individual choice in achieving quality education. The voucher is an 
eighteenth century idea and first appeared in Adam Smith's Wealth 
of  nation^.^ Smith believed if teachers' creativity and energy were 
put to the test, they would stimulate the market, more efficient 
teaching would result and teachers would prosper. The choice of a 
school by parents would trigger a subsidy from the government to 
the school.' 
Thomas Paine, another early voucher proponent, specifically 
suggested giving lower class families the opportunity for schooling 
through a negative income tax scaled progressively in favor of the 
poor. Paine believed that his plan would: (1) be easy to imple- 
ment; (2) insure competition among schools; and (3) decentralize 
3. Areen & Jencks, Educational Vouchers: A Proposal for Diversiv and 
Choice, 72 TCHRS. C. REC. 327, 328-29 (1972); J .  COONS & S. SUGARMAN, 
EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL 19-20 (1978) [hereinafter 
cited as COONS & SUGARMAN]; LaNoue, The Politics of Education, 73 TCHRS. C. 
REC. 304 (1971). 
4. COO&, 0f ~ a m i l ~  Choice and Public Education, 61 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 10 
(1979). 
5 .  See Rebell, Educational Voucher Reform Empirical Insights from the Expe- 
rience of New York's Schools for the Handicapped, 14 URB. LAW. 441 (Summer, 
1982). The G.I. Bill, 38 U.S.C. 8 1651 (Supp. I11 1980), was a federal attempt to 
use vouchers for higher education. Higher education has never had the same 
community and government support as primary and secondary education. 
6. 340 (Great Books ed. 1952). 
7. COONS & SUGARMAN, supra note 3, at 20-34. 
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control of education, countering prevailing desires of aristocrats to 
maintain their power by depending on ign~rance .~  
Another great eighteenth century thinker, Milton Friedman, 
revived interest in voucher plans by proposing that parents be 
given a voucher equal to the cost of educating their child.g All 
schools, public and private, would charge tuition on a per capita 
basis. Schools would compete to attract students. The gov- 
ernment's role in education would be limited to the distribution of 
vouchers and the imposition of minimum education standards.I0 
Friedman's plan involves a completely unregulated voucher sys- 
tem. Wealthier parents could pay tuition amounts over the govern- 
ment voucher. The outcome would be an educational system more 
segregated along economic lines. Poorer families would not have 
the ability to supplement their vouchers. Under Friedman's plan, 
the schools could set their own admission policies and could sys- 
tematically exclude minorities." 
In recent years, other voucher proposals have appeared.12 In 
1970, the Center for the Study of Public Policy (CSPP) received a 
grant from the Office of Economic Opportunity and conducted a 
study of voucher pos~ibilities!~ The CSPP proposal applied only to 
public schools and was based upon the belief that it would assist 
minority children and provide parents with greater diversity of 
choice. While several school systems considered the CSPP model, 
only the Alum Rock School District in East San Jose, California, 
agreed to implement a federally funded voucher experiment in 
1972 based upon the CSPP model. The school district had approx- 
imately 14,000 students and twenty-one schools. The experiment 
did not involve private schools, and its results were mixed!4 
8. West, Thomas Paine's Voucher Scheme for Public Education, 33 S. ECON. J .  
378 (1967). 
9. See M. Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in CAPITALISM AND 
FREEDOM 85 (1962). 
10. MCGUIRE, supra note 2, at 3. 
11. Id. at 4. 
12. See Sizer & Whitten, A Proposal for a Poor Children's Bill of Rights, 5 
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 58 (1968); Coleman, Toward Open Schools, PUB. INTEREST, 
Fall 1967, at 20; Arons, Equity, Option, and Vouchers, 72 TCHRS. C. REC. 337 
(1971); MCGUIRE, supra note 2, at 2-6. 
13. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY, A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON 
FINANCING E D U C A ~ O N  BY PAYMENTS O PARENTS (1970); see also Areen and 
Jencks, supra note 3. 
14. Levinson, The Alum Rock Voucher Demonstration: Three Years of Im- 
plementation (1976) (Rand Corp. Report No. P5631); Taylor, Educational 
Vouchers: Addressing the Establishment Clause Issue, 11 PAC. L.J. 1011, 1064 
(1979); COONS & SUGARMAN, supra note 3, at 216. 
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The most persistent, sophisticated, and persuasive proponents 
of educational vouchers have been John Coons and Stephen Sugar- 
man, who previously had laid the intellectual foundation for the 
equal educational financing of public schools," which resulted in 
the Serrano v. Priest6 decision holding that financing public 
schools on the basis of the local property tax was an uncon- 
stitutional violation of the fourteenth amendment and parallel 
clauses in the California Constitution. More recently they have 
been advocates for the California Initiative, an attempt to place a 
referendum in support of educational vouchers on the ballot in 
California. Because of the care and conceptual richness of Coons 
and Sugarman's voucher concept, I will analyze educational 
vouchers through the prism of their proposal. 
Under Coons and Sugarman's voucher concept, the "Family 
Choice in Education Plan," the family exercises the choice. The 
essence of their voucher concept is: 
. . . that each year there are to be provided to each school-age child in the 
experimental area(s) a scholarship certificate entitling the child to education in 
public or private school of its family choice; that the child himself as he gains 
maturity, will be given increased formal power over the choice made; that 
families will not face significant schooling costs above the value of the scholar- 
ship (for example, no added tuition); that participating schools will be 
approved by the government, but requirements for approval will be limited 
largely to concern safety, fraud, and minimum educational inputs; that an 
effective information and counseling service will be provided to assist the 
family in making an informed choice; that subject to space availability, children 
will be admitted to schools of their choice, with admissions by a state conducted 
lottery when there is excess demand for a particular school; that adequate 
transport will be given free; and that the present population of teachers will be 
given substantial job protection in the transition years." 
Originally, a model in the Family Choice Education Act (FCEA) it 
eliminated family wealth as an influence i.lpnn the size of the 
Within limits the original FCEA made the size of the 
voucher vary according to the judgment of the family itself rather 
than of government alone. A family would make some contribu- 
15. J. COONS, W. CLUNE, AND S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC 
EDUCATION (1970). 
16. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). 
17. COONS s~ SUGARMAN, supra note 3, at 31-32. Coon's and Sugarman's views 
have changed over the years but the quoted passage is the essence of their 
program. 
18. Coons & Sugarman, Family Choice in Education: A Model State System 
for Vouchers, 59 CAL. L. REV. 321, 329 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Coons & 
Sugarman, Family Choice in Education]. 
Heinonline - -  15 Urb. Law. 116 1983 
tion out of its own wealth towards the support of education.lg The 
initial proposal created a variety of schools at which tuition levels 
differed. Parents could choose the kind of school they would like 
to send their children to, based on educational expenditures. The 
advantages claimed for the FCEA plan are that it would create a 
new educational market offering of diverse schooling at differing 
levels of per-pupil costs; it would place a ceiling on a family's 
educational cost; it would benefit poor families through an in- 
creased voucher amount; the local property tax for education 
would cease; and family choice would benefit good schools and 
penalize poor ones.20 
Other benefits claimed by Coons and Sugarman's plan in- 
cluded: (1) neutralization of the effects bearing on wealth through 
power eq~alization;~' (2) decisional power would be vested in the 
family unit rather than a board of education; (3) the purchasing of 
educational goods and services would be accomplished with 
greater efficiency; (4) accountability through ease of transfer from 
school to school would increase and enable parents to exercise fate 
over (5) education would be independent of spending 
from a tax referendum; (6) variety in the style and content of 
education would increase;23 (7) greater experimentation would be 
encouraged; and (8) real community control would result and 
racial integration would be promoted.24 
In 1979 when Coons attempted to place a Family Choice in 
Education proposal on the ballot in California (the California 
In i t i a t i~e ) ,~~  he took advantage of California political winds against 
increased government, the level of taxation and public spending, 
and the climate against court ordered racial integration. Coons and 
Sugarman changed their plan to bring it in line with the political 
realities of 1980. Thus, power equalization is gone. Educational 
expenditures were limited to 1979-1980 levels; per-pupil cost in 
19. Fundamental to the original Coons and Sugarman proposal was that: (1) 
the quality of publicly financed education would not be a function of wealth other 
than the wealth of the state as a whole; and (2) above an adequate minimum 
expenditure per pupil required by law, families might be permittted to choose 
among dollar levels of educational offerings. Id. at 329. 
20. Id. at 330. 
21. Id. at 336. Power equalization is uniformity of capacity to spend for 
something such as education. 
22. Id. at 337. 
23. Id. at 339. 
24. Id. at 339-40. 
25. An Initiative for Family Choice in Education (1980) [hereinafter cited as 
California Initiative]. 
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public schools was limited to 90 percent of that of private schools;26 
and appropriations for administration of the State Department of 
Education were limited to one half of 1 percent of the total cost of 
educat i~n.~ '  In an economic sense, the California Initiative offered 
a nineteenth century liberal ticket. 
Both private and parochial schools could participate in the 
voucher plans.28 The California Initiative established three classes 
of schools: public, independent and family choice;29 and it enabled 
parents to redeem vouchers at private schools and at a new cate- 
gory of independent public schools which were governed by a 
combination of parents, teachers, trustees and others.30 The public 
schools would continue to exist and parents would not receive 
vouchers for attendance at them." The California Constitution 
would be modified to eliminate property taxes as the major vehicle 
of funding elementary and secondary education.32 None of the 
three classes of schools could accept or charge tuition over and 
above the voucher fee," although educational costs could differ. A 
private school participating in the program could limit its 
e n r ~ l l m e n t , ~ ~  giving priority to present students and their siblings, 
and limit attendance to boys or girls." Beyond that, schools would 
have to admit any applicant regardless of race, creed or scholastic 
a~h i evemen t .~~  If there were too many applicants, admission would 
be determined by 10ttery.~' Free transportation would be provided 
within limitations as provided by the legi~la ture .~~ The California 
Initiative did not obtain the necessary signatures for placement on 
the California ballot in 1980, but supporters will resume the peti- 
tion drive for the 1984 ballot.39 
26. Id. at 9 15. 
27. Id. at Q 5. 
28. Id. at Q 13. 
29. Id. at Q 6. 
30. Id. at Q 10. 
31. Id. at 9 6. 
32. Id. at 9 l(b). 
33. Id. at 9 14. 
34. Id. at Q 15. 
35. Id. at 8 7. 
36. Id. at $0 2, l(g). 
37. Id. at 9 7. 
38. Id. (obviously a canard to anti-busing proponents). 
39. Hoachlander, Financing Public Education in the Wake of Federal and State 
Spending Cuts: Crisis and Opportunities, 15 URB. LAW. 148 n.27 (Fall, 1982). 
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11. Philosophical Roots of Family Choice 
Unlike many reformers, Coons and Sugarman have come armed 
with a full philosophical system underlying their proposals. From a 
philosophical perspective, they are grounded in the idealism of the 
eighteenth century that believed in the perfectibility of man. They 
establish two ideal types of persons that can be produced by 
educational systems: "conditioned" man versus "autonomous" 
man. 
Autonomy is 
the full development of the child's latent capacity for independent reflection 
and for judgment on issues of personal morality and social justice; it is the link 
between intellect and responsible action. The perception or moral possibility is 
humanity's principal distinction among the company of Earth.40 
The alternative to autonomous man is "conditioned man," an 
individual taught to believe in and to do good as his teachers view 
it." "Conditioned man" is the product of our current educational 
systems. The roots of the idea of "autonomous" man can be traced 
back to Plato7s citizen of the ideal state, a position achievable by 
very few.42 Plato's elitism has been democratically transformed to 
the eighteenth century view that all persons can be trained to be 
Coons and Sugarman also have borrowed from John Stuart Mill, 
who believed that the government should enforce universal educa- 
tion, but should not provide one. Rather, the government should 
give parents the means to obtain the education they select for their 
children." "Conditioned man" is straight Mill: 
A general state education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be 
exactly like one another: and as the mould in which it casts them is that which 
please the predominant power in the government . . . it establishes a despot- 
ism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body." 
Like many reformers, Coons and Sugarman have tunnel vision 
about the institution they are trying to change. They place too 
much emphasis on the socializing import of education. Any educa- 
40. COONS & SUGARMAN, supra note 3, at 40. 
41. Id. 
42. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 3 3 7 0 ~ ;  G .  SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 
49-54, 55, 71 (3d ed. 1961). 
43. Kalodner, Book Review, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1224, 1225 (1979). 
44. Miu, On Liberty in THREE ESSAYS 129 (Oxford ed. 1912). 
45. Id. at 130. 
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tional system is but a reflection of the larger society. They are not 
only revolting against the educational system, but against the 
structure of modern life. It is their rejection of the present that 
links them to modern radical and reactionary thought. Their con- 
ception of conditioned man reminds one of Karl Marx's distinc- 
tion, particularly found in his earlier writings, between alienated 
man under capitalism and unalienated man under c ~ m m u n i s m . ~ ~  In 
the twentieth century we can see analogies to "autonomous" and 
"conditioned" man in the work of Herbert Mar~use .~ '  
While some educational reformers have moved politically to the 
left," the political program of Coons and Sugarman is clearly to 
the right of the new conservatism, which looks backward to a time 
when government was less intrusive and solutions to the problems 
seemed more attainable. 
111. Family Choice and Family Control 
Coons and Sugarman have concluded that the focus of educational 
decisionmaking should be in the family itself rather than in the 
professional educational b u r e a u c r a ~ y . ~ ~  In locating the source of 
control in the family, Coons and Sugarman return to an eighteenth 
century educational approach.'O Families are not what they used to 
be. Nor is this a recent development. As Christopher Lasch has 
remarked: "The family has slowly come apart for more than 100 
years."*' Voucher proponents ignore the importance of the break- 
down of the family as a major source of additional burdens upon 
the school system and a reason why schools have not fulfilled their 
expected roles. Under the present educational system the im- 
portance of family background cannot be underestimated in ex- 
. . p!aln!ng the vcrirtions ef educztiena! a t t a i a m e i ~ t . ~ ~  No school re- 
form could assist in making adults more equal, for children are 
more influenced by what happens at home than by what happens in 
46. See generally B. OLLMAN, ALIENATION: MARX'S CONCEPTION F MAN IN 
CAPITALIST OCIETY 131,232,24748 (1971), G. LICHTHEIM, ARXISM 44 (1965). 
47. Seegenerally H. MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN 2 (1964); H. MARCUSE, 
AN ESSSAY ON LIBERATION (1969). 
48. See S. BOWLES & H. G I N ~ S ,  CHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA (1976). 
49. COONS & SUGARMAN, supra note 3, at 42-54. 
50. See L. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 1607- 
1783, 480-91 (1970). 
51. C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED xx
(19791. 
' 52.'C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF FAMILY AND 
SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 143 (1972). 
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The problem of placing the focus of educational decision- 
making in the family is that those most able to make an informed 
choice are families that probably have made the best use of existing 
educational facilities or have moved their children into private 
schools. Can we be so certain that the parents will make the best 
judgment in the interest of the Will poor parents have the 
information they need to make an informed choice?55 
IV. Competition and the Marketplace 
For voucher proponents, the competition of the marketplace will 
bring educational accountability, quality and di~ersity. '~ An im- 
portant part of the family choice concept and the California Initia- 
tive is the establishment of new schools accomplished with a mini- 
mum of regulation and over~ight.~' Does the marketplace analogy 
apply to education? If so, which industries should be the model- 
airline, automobile, steel, railroad or correspondence and trade 
However, it has been suggested that the market analogy is 
inappropriate to public education: 
Public schools are not a noncompetitive monopoly like the postal service. They 
are highly decentralized and they do compete with private schools which enroll 
15-35% of the students in most cities and with each other. (There is . . . no 
research which shows that public schools are "better" in cities where the 
greatest competition with private schools exists. Because of the "drainoff" of 
the middle class in these cities . . . the reverse is more likely true.) City schools 
also compete against suburban schools and with each other for appropriations, 
teachers, special projects, and status as well as in extracurricular ac t iv i t i e~ .~~  
In a time of declining enrollment and uncertainty as to what 
approaches really enable children to learn, who will be the entre- 
preneurs who will bring new schools into e~istence?~"What kind of 
53. Id. at 255. 
54. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,242 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
55. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
56. Coons & Sugarman, Family Choice in Education, supra note 18, at 330. 
57. California Initiative, supra note 25, $ 10. Any public agency could es- 
tablish a not-for-profit corporation, an independent school outside of the present 
public school system. A state agency would certify upon proper application an 
independent or family choice school, but the state could not increase the curricu- 
lum requirements and standards for teaching personnel beyond those in existence 
in 1979. 
58. LaNoue, The Politics of Education, 73 TCHRS. C. REC. 304,313-14 (1971). 
59. Id. at 314. 
60. Ginzberg, The Economics of the Voucher System, 72 TCHRS. C. REC. 373, 
379 (1971). 
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expertise is required to run a school? Are knowledgeable people 
likely to have the start-up capital? The California Initiative pro- 
vides that family choice schools will only be not-for-profit cor- 
poration~.~'  Under the model Family Choice in Education Act, 
individual entrepreneurs could open proprietary schools.62 The 
hustlers and "quick buck" artists rather than the educators may be 
drawn into opening new schools. Consumer protection may re- 
quire increased regulation. As success will be measured by enroll- 
ment, education may become vaudeville. Extravagant claims, 
heavy advertising and other recruiting techniques will be used. 
Instead of promoting quality and diversity, competition may force 
schools to offer the lowest common denominator to attract stu- 
dents. Public schools will be forced to charge the lowest possible 
tuition and have the least enriched programs, but serve the stu- 
dents with the most expensive educational needs and disabilities. 
V. Information: The Marketplace and 
Informed Choice 
In the educational marketplace will the consumer have adequate 
information to make an informed choice? What information is 
appropriate? Under the California Initiative, certified schools 
would have to disclose information regarding their curricula, 
teaching methods, qualifications of teachers and use of  resource^.^' 
The California Initiative does have provisions assuring parents 
adequate information through sources independent of any school 
or school a ~ t h o r i t y . ~ ~  Parents with special informational needs 
could obtain vouchers to retain the services of educational coun- 
s e l o r ~ . ~ ~  There are no details offered on the nature of the inde- 
r\er?der?t sources, the werkings ef the educati~na! c~unse!or grants 
or how funding the information network will be accomplished. 
Entrepreneurial educators will provide a surfeit of information 
to attract consumers, but if other social programs are any guide, 
the poor may not be able to make an informed ~ h o i c e . ~  The 
61. Generally, a not-for-profit corporation cannot distribute dividends, but it 
can fix reasonable compensation. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §§ 515, 
202 (McKinney 1970). 
62. Coons & Sugarman, Family Choice in Education, supra note 18, at 335, 
394-95. 
63. California Initiative, supra note 25, 5 13. 
64. Id. at § 16. 
65. Id. 
66. See generally Olivas, Information Access Inequities: A Fatal Flaw in Edu- 
cational Voucher Plans, 10 J .  L.  & EDUC. 441, 453 (1981). 
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socially advantaged individual will have access to more informa- 
tion of educational alternatives compared to the disadvantaged. 
Thus, the marketplace may raise the information imperfections 
which occur most often among socially disadvantaged groups.'j7' 
VI. Promoting Diversity of Schooling 
Opportunities through a Voucher Plan 
Voucher proponents assume that the public schools exhibit a cer- 
tain sameness, and that the adoption of a voucher plan would 
promote a diversity of educational opportunity that does not now 
exist .68 
In higher education, where a voucher-type approach through 
guaranteed student loans is used to finance education, diversity has 
not been promoted. Is there much diversity in private and paro- 
chial schools? Accrediting agencies, prestige and the marketplace 
all place pressures on schools to conform. Even without govern- 
ment regulation, professional accrediting bodies may intercede to 
stifle true diversity and originality. Unfortunately, the market- 
place often works against diversity. 
Will there be competition or will the educational marketplace 
become highly segmented? Elite private schools may not partici- 
pate in a voucher program. They are already highly attractive. 
Their admission policies are often based on exclusivity and they 
may fear additional regulation. Parochial schools would partici- 
pate and would grow somewhat, but as most of the poor and those 
remaining in the public schools are Protestant, growth might 
quickly reach its limits. The new schools will be competing against 
the public schools. A constant criticism of voucher proposals is that 
the remaining middle class and academically "normal" students 
will depart from the public schools, leaving only the problems. To 
some extent this has happened. To accelerate it will not foster 
competition, but will increase stratification based on race, class, 
religion and on learning or behavioral disabilities. 
VII. Administrative Burdens and Financial Expense 
Vouchers offer the siren songs of lower education costs, more 
efficient use of educational resources and, most attractive, an end 
to the educational bureaucracy. Yet as a practical matter, many of 
67. Id. at 456. 
68. COONS & SUGARMAN, supra note 3, at 42. 
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the savings and efficiencies of voucher proposals seem grounded 
more in wishfulness than in fact. One must seriously question 
whether the administration of vouchers would be less burdensome 
than the present educational bureaucracies, and whether a 
voucher system would give parents greater input into school and 
educational choices than at present. Despite the intent of the 
California Initiative to limit r eg~ la t i on ,~~  a voucher system may 
lead to increased regulation of private schools, a reason why many 
would not opt to participate. In most states private schools are 
regulated leniently, with state concern in terms of certification, 
school attendance requirements and requiring nonpublic schools 
to meet building, fire, safety and health  requirement^.^^ Inevitably, 
school certification as proposed under the California Initiative and 
the infusion of state funds will lead to more state control of private 
education. 
The administration of the vouchers themselves would be 
cumbersome. The use of existing resources would be inefficient, 
for instance, closing or leasing existing schools and equipment, and 
the shifting of teaching and administrative personnel. Moreover, 
because the idea envisions new schools springing up, they would 
not be cost-efficient and would have high start-up costs.71 More 
schools, each separately run, would lead to a greater percentage of 
the budget spent for administrative overhead. The possibilities of 
large annual shifts in student population would make planning 
difficult if not impos~ible .~~ The administrative savings might be a 
mirage; the costs would merely be transferred to each school. 
If vouchers are like any other government program (Medicare 
and the Guaranteed Student Loan Program are two useful com- 
parisons), substantial state regulation would have to occur to guard 
agaiiist fraiid. Abandoning iocai districts might make schoois iess 
accountable to parents than they are presently. In the remaining 
public schools, the diversity that exists might be ended. If the 
voucher proposal is not to discriminate against minorities, greater 
69. California Initiative, supra note 25, at § 10. 
70. See ELSEN, STATE REGULATION OF NON-PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK IN PUBLIC ONTROLS FOR NON-PUBLIC S HOOLS 104 (Erickson ed. 
1969); SORGEN, KAPLIN, DUFFY & MARGOLIN, STATE SCHOOL AND FAMILY 15,82,84 
(2d ed. 1979). 
71. Ginzberg, supra note 60, at 376. 
72. The original model statute provided that each January 15 a pupil would 
select his school, although a student could switch schools in the middle of the year. 
Coons & Sugarman, Family Choice in Education, supra note 18, at 354. See $ 3  7 
and 14 for transfer rights of students in the Initiative. 
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regulation than under the present system might be necessary.73 
Another problem is the sheer size of many urban school districts." 
What may be feasible in a smaller district may become an admin- 
istrative nightmare and horribly expensive in an urban environ- 
ment. There will be hidden and not so hidden costs: monitoring 
schools-assuming that the accurate information is transmitted- 
and costs of transportation. 
The California Initiative provides that the certificate shall reflect 
the costs of t ransportat i~n~~ and the common or public schools shall 
"transport their pupils in accord with reasonable conditions and 
limits upon costs to be fixed by law."76 Given the furor over use of 
busing to promote racial integration, is it likely that a legislature 
will provide sufficient funds to enable the poor, locked in the inner 
cities, to transport themselves to schools that in all probability will 
not be in their neighborhoods? Transportation is of key im- 
portance if a child is to have more than a choice of his neighbor- 
hood school. Transportation limits the geographic distance of free 
choice. The transportation issue and the drawing of district lines 
are difficult and sensitive issues." 
VIII. Legal Issues 
Coons and Sugarman fail to specifically address the many legal 
issues involved in a voucher pr~gram. '~  Vouchers have fared un- 
successfully in the courts in two areas: the use of vouchers to avoid 
desegregation and aid to parents who send their children to paro- 
chial schools.79 
In the early 1960s several southern states enacted legislation 
offering tuition grants to parents who sent their children to "pri- 
vate schools." The private schools were segregated and had been 
established to avoid dismantling dual school systems. Public 
schools were sometimes closed. Use of public funds to maintain 
73. Areen & Jencks, supra note 3, at 332. 
74. See Dentler, Vouchers: A Problem of Scale 72 TCHRS. C. REC. 383, 385 
(1971). 
75. California Initiative, supra note 25, 5 14. 
76. Id. at § 7. 
77. Arons, supra note 12, at 355. 
78. These points are made by Tractenberg, Some Problems with Family Con- 
trol, 57 TEX. L. REV. 155 (1978) and Taylor, supra note 14, at 1065. 
79. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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these private schools was held uncoxistitutional as a violation of the 
equal protection clause.s0 
Basically, the family choice plan offers freedom of choice. It is 
questionable that a voucher plan could be constitutionally in- 
troduced in a community that had been under a court-ordered 
integration plan. Coons and Sugarman are extremely optimistic 
that the voucher system would improve integration: 
Integration that occurs by choice is both stable and enduring. Indeed, the only 
intelligible meaning of stability is that those involved at the least accept what- 
ever integration has been achie~ed.~' 
If the past twenty-five years of attempted school desegregation 
have shown anything, it is that whites will migrate to other com- 
munities or attend private schools before they will go to school with 
blacks. 
Freedom-of-choice plans have been found unconstitutional 
where there was a dual system previously segregated by law.82 
Despite recent efforts by the federal go~e rnmen t ,~~  a freedom-of- 
choice plan introduced in a school district under a court order to 
integrate, or where free choice had been intentionally used to 
delay integration, might not pass constitutional muster.84 
Freedom of choice works only as an integration device when 
there are no other choices. Green v. County School Boardss in- 
volved New Kent County in eastern Virginia. About one-half of 
the population was black and there was no residential segregation 
in the county. The school system had but two schools: the New 
Kent School on the east side of the county, which was white, and 
the Watkins School on the west side of the county, which was all 
80. Griffin v. Countv School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); South Carolina Bd. 
Educ., 296 F. Supp. 199 (D. S. Car. 1968), aff 'd per curiam 393 U.S. 222 (1968); 
Coffee v. State Educ. Fin. Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969); Hall v. 
St. Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), aff'dper curiam 
368 U.S. 515 (1962); Hawkins v. North Carolina Bd. Educ., 11 Race Rel. L. Rep. 
745 (W.D.N.C. 1966); Lee v. Macon City Bd. Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. 
Ala. 1967); Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Asst. Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. 
La. 1967), aff'd per curiam 389 U.S. 571 (1978); Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. 
Asst. Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. La. 1968), aff 'd per curiam 393 U.S. 17 
(1968). \-- - -, ~ 
81. COONS & SUGARMAN, supra note 3, at 116. 
82. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430,440-41 (1968); Monroe v. Bd. 
of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450,458 (1968); Raney v. Bd. Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968). 
83. U.S. Endorses Chicago's Proposal for Voluntary School Integration N.Y. 
TIMES, February 13, 1982 at 1, col. 2. 
84. Dayton Bd. Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Keyes v. Denver 
School Dist., 413 U.S. 189,202 (1973); United States v. Omaha School Dist., 521 
F.2d 530,537 (8th Cir. 1975); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 506 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974). 
85. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
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black. In three years under a freedom-of-choice plan, 115 black 
children enrolled in the predominantly white New Kent School, 
but 85 percent of the black children in the county still attended the 
all-black school. No whites had transferred to the Watkins School. 
In the Alum Rock voucher experiment, 80 percent of the children 
attended their neighborhood schools.86 Thus, even if not con- 
stitutionally impermissible, efforts at desegregation would prob- 
ably come to a halt under the free-choice plan. At best, the burden 
of integration would be completely borne by the minority commu- 
 nit^.^ 
IX. The Impact of Vouchers on Private and 
Parochial Schools-State Action and the End of 
Private Schools? 
Almost all applications of the fourteenth amendment to private 
conduct based on a finding of "state action" have involved an 
attack upon private racial discriminati~n.~~ This is particularly true 
in the context of educational institutions. Neither the regulation of 
educational standards nor tax exemptions has been held to be 
sufficient to trigger the state action clause of the fourteenth amend- 
ment against a private educational i n s t i t u t i~n .~~  Given the addi- 
tional administrative and fiscal oversight that will result under a 
voucher program, the question arises whether cumulatively this 
might involve state actiong0 and whether schools that participate in 
voucher programs could in any sense be considered private. 
X. The Establishment Clause Question 
A more difficult issue is whether educational vouchers violate the 
establishment clause of the first amendment.91 Under the Califor- 
86. See Levinson, supra note 14. 
87. California Initiative, supra note 25, at 8 9, provided that no pupil enroll- 
ment in a common school shall suffer discrimination on the basis of race, religion 
or gender. 
88. Bright v. Isenbarger, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971). 
89. Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Greenya V. 
George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
995 (1975). 
90. In Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974), the court 
held that tax exemptions, scholarships and loans, government support of research 
projects, contracts with Philadelphia and the construction, leasing and financing 
of buildings were sufficient to demonstrate that the Commonwealth of Pennsylva- 
nia had so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the 
university that state action within the meaning of the constitution existed. 
91. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see generally Taylor, supra note 14. 
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nia Initiative, parochial schools could participate in voucher pro- 
g r a m ~ . ~ ~  Under United States Supreme Court decisions, to survive 
constitutional scrutiny state aid to a parochial school (1) must have 
a secular purpose; (2) must neither advance nor inhibit religion; 
and (3) must not foster an excessive entanglement between gov- 
ernment and religion.93 
In Committee for Public Education v. N y q ~ i s t , ~ ~  the Supreme 
Court invalidated a New York statute that provided for direct 
money grants from the state to parochial schools to be used for 
maintenance and repair of school facilities and equipment. The 
Court felt this had the primary effect of advancing religion.95 The 
Court also held that tuition reimbursement and tax relief limited to 
no more than one half of the tuition paid afforded to parents of 
children attending elementary or secondary nonpublic schools 
violated the establishment clause.% Voucher proponents believe 
that aid to parochial schools would survive constitutional attack 
because the assistance would be given directly to the parents rather 
than to the Yet, in Public Funds for Public Schools v. 
Byme, a New Jersey statute that provided tax deductions to par- 
ents of children attending nonpublic schools was held un- 
con~titutional.~~ Even if a voucher plan could survive the secular 
purpose and primary effect standards, it still would have to with- 
stand the excessive entanglement test.99 The Supreme Court di- 
vided 5 to 4 in upholding a New York statute that allowed reim- 
bursement to nonpublic schools that had paid for mandated testing 
reporting services, but did so because the aid was very limited and 
the statute provided for a workable system to ensure that the 
granted funds were used for secular purposes.lW The Court 
added: "under the relevant cases the outcome would likely be 
different if there were no effective means for insuring that the cash 
reimbursements would cover only secular services."lol 
92. California Initiative, supra note 25, § 13. 
93. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
94. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
95. Id. at 779-780. 
96. Id. at 796-97. 
97. Taylor, supra note 14, at 1074. 
98. 590 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1979), aff'd mem., 442 U.S. 907 (1979). 
99. Taylor, supra note 14, at 1078; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL L W 
866 (1978). 
100. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980). 
101. Id. at 659. 
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Under a voucher system, the amount of entanglement and ad- 
ministrative oversight would be great and would not necessarily be 
limited to secular purposes. The flow of so much public money to 
private schools would result in substantial reporting requirements 
and governmental oversight. A voucher program such as the Cali- 
fornia Initiative may have difficulty in surviving either the primary 
effect or excessive entanglement obstacles.lm 
XI. Family Choice: Teachers, Unions and 
Administrators 
Perhaps the most intractable problem in bringing a voucher pro- 
gram to reality is the united opposition of all sectors of the educa- 
tional establishment: teachers, administrators and unions. In the 
words of Wilson Riles, Superintendent of Schools of California: 
"California needs a voucher system like Jimmy Carter needs an- 
other brother."lo3 
Perhaps the most rapid change in the structure of education in 
the past twenty-five years has been the widespread unionization of 
teachers.'" Coons and Sugarman admit that family choice will be 
greatly resisted by educators, that-in the short run-the objec- 
tives of the "Luddite school" teachers and administrators cannot 
be erased but moderated. They suggest that economic guarantees 
will be the minimum necessary to diffuse the resistance of labor.'" 
They believe that family choice will give individual teachers un- 
precedented control over the classr~oms. '~ This may be wishful 
thinking, for when teachers had theoretical control over their 
classrooms before unionization, they had less power and were at 
the mercy of arbitrary administrators and local school boards.Im 
They suggest that economic guarantees would be the minimum 
necessary to diffuse the resistance of labor.Io8 That too may be 
overly optimistic. Certainly economic guarantees alone do not 
102. Taylor, supra note 14, at 1082-83. 
103. Dale Lane, School Voucher Plan Resurfaces to Strong Welcome, San Jose 
Mercury, Feb. 16, 1979, at 16, col. Al.  
104. See Gee, The Unionization of Mr. Chips: A Survey Analysis of Collective 
Bargaining in the Public Schools, 15 WILLAMETTE L. J. 367 (1979). 
105. COONS & SUGARMAN, supra note 3, at 174. 
106. Id. 
107. Gee, supra note 104, at 379. 
108. COONS & SUGARMAN, supra, note 3, at 174. 
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protect other teachers' rights vis-a-vis administrators, students or 
the community. Surely the family choice plan would bring a lessen- 
ing of teacher authority and control. Coons and Sugarman believe 
that teachers fear vouchers because of their concern for competi- 
tion rather than the fear of arbitrary action by parents.'@' It was this 
lack of power that introduced unionization in the first place.l1° It is 
hard to visualize that teachers' unions are willing to give back 
contractual rights once gained. 
Coons and Sugarman recommend on a trial basis the relaxation 
of certification control in public  school^!^' Certification, like tenure 
and unionization, has moved beyond its original  purpose^."^ 
Reducing controls on certification will be greatly fought by orga- 
nized teaching groups for many of the wrong reasons. Attempts to 
apply credential criteria to private schools will be fiercely resisted 
and provide another reason for them to opt out of the voucher 
plan. Coons and Sugarman envision a long-term withering or 
shrinking of tenure rights as teachers move from school to scho01."~ 
The family-choice plan ignores the fact that factors other than 
teachers' competence, such as shifting demographic patterns, may 
cause changes in a school's population or a school's popularity with 
parents. Their suggestions for ways of lessening the trauma of 
severance would do little to promote teachers' security. 
With state monies flowing into private schools, they too will 
become ripe for unionization. With the breakdown of the local 
school district, union power may actually increase.l14 The strength 
of teachers' unions and teachers' own insecurity seem incompat- 
ible with a large-scale family choice program. Even if economic 
security can be insured, the resulting inefficiencies might make the 
family choice program substantially more expensive than present 
educational systcixs. assump:ioii that teachers, if they do iioi 
like the school environment, could move from school to school 
does not reflect the present educational market nor the ease of such 
movement. 
XII. Vouchers and the Future of Public Education 
Despite this criticism of the California Initiative and the family- 
choice education plan, Coons and Sugarman are to be con- 
109. Id. at 173. 
110. Gee, supra note 104, at 379. 
111. COONS & SUGARMAN, supra note 3, at 170. 
112. Id. at 170-72. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 176. 
Heinonline - -  15 Urb. Law. 130 1983 
FAMILY CHOICE AND EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS 131 
gratulated for providing serious, thoughtful alternatives to present 
educational structures. Some of their critics have claimed that 
voucher programs (and other support alternatives such as tuition 
assistance to parents who send their children to other than public 
schools)115 signal the end of public education as it is now known.l16 
This is overdrawn. Vouchers may drive out the most talented 
students and leave some schools, particularly in urban and rural 
areas, even more segregated and stratified than at present. The 
critics have overestimated the political influence of voucher pro- 
ponents. Other attempts besides Alum Rock to introduce vouch- 
ers have not been welcomed by the public. In 1974, New Hamp- 
shire proposed to commence a less regulated voucher experiment 
than Alum Rock to assess public attitudes towards the voucher 
concept. Unlike Alum Rock, the New Hampshire proposal in- 
cluded private nonsectarian schools in their second year of opera- 
tion. No school district in the state was willing to participate. Four 
districts overwhelmingly rejected the program by a vote of their 
citizens. 11' 
Vouchers may be an idea in search of a constituency. In January 
1976, an East Hartford, Connecticut, school district voted down its 
proposed plan to experiment with vouchers after two years of 
studying and planning.l18 In 1978, a Michigan group, Citizens for a 
More Sensible Financing of Education, placed a voucher proposal 
on the November 1978 general ballot. It called for the legislature to 
provide an educational voucher to each child in attendance of 
public and nonpublic elementary and secondary schools, the pro- 
hibition of property taxes by local and intermediate school districts 
for any purpose other than retirement, and to establish a program 
of general state taxation. The proposal was defeated by a 74 to 26 
percent margin. llg 
It is not surprising that despite such great dissatisfaction with 
public schools, voters have been unwilling to overthrow the educa- 
tional structure completely. When faced with a choice, voters do 
- 
115. A Tuition Tax Credit Initiative sponsored by the National Taxpayers 
Union would provide a credit against state income tax of up to $1,200 for every 
full-time student. See Taylor, supra note 14, at 1066. The Tuition Tax Relief Act 
of 1981 S. 550,97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981), sponsored by Senators Packwood and 
Moynihan, would provide a tax credit equal to 50% of a taxpayer's educational 
expenses up to a maximum of $500 the first year, and $1,000 after July 31,1983. 
116. Butts, Educational Vouchers: The Private Pursuit of the Public Purse, 61 
PHI DELTA KAPPAN 7 (1979). 
117. Tractenberg, supra note 78, at 160. 
118. McGuire, supra note 2, at 9. 
119. Id. at 11. 
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recall the centrality of education in American life. A voucher 
system would mark a return to a more atomized educational sys- 
tem of schooling reminiscent of the eighteenth century.'" Vouch- 
ers will change the public's perception of education, particularly 
the central role of education in our political life. 
Education is different. In an increasingly centralized society, the 
loci of power have become ever more distant. Local school boards 
are one of the few remaining ramparts of citizen democracy for all, 
whether or not the constituents have children in public schools. 
Even in large city school systems, the movement for decentraliza- 
tion of schools is a call to return to the traditional concept of 
community control of schools. Family choice places the locus of 
educational power into the hands of parents who may not have the 
expertise to run schools, may not have roots in the community and 
would operate apart from the political process. Education is too 
important to be left to parents and educators alone. Even those 
who have no children or have children in private schools have 
important interests in and impact on public education. They are 
affected by their local school system. Vouchers will disenfranchise 
those without school children12' and will atomize the broad lobby in 
favor of or interested in education. 
The local property tax has been a source of inequality and 
unfairness. Thanks in part to much of the earlier work by Pro- 
fessors Coons and Sugarman, the inequalities of taxing have been 
remedied in many states. But the direct financial and political stake 
of the public at large in public education is an important reason 
why the present structure of education should not be completely 
dismantled. To dismantle the present educational structure would 
make education, particularly public education, just another social 
welfare prnornm - e- ---' Not a! citizecs .xi!! hal~p, 2 stake i: public e&ca. 
tion and support for it will decline. 
Yet, voucher ideas should not be rejected out of hand. It may be 
time to work within the present structure of education for reform. 
Schools themselves are focusing more on essentials. Attempts at 
integration seem ended for the time being. Schools are returning to 
educating the student. Within this context more experimentation 
involving vouchers is needed. Vouchers provide a particularly 
useful way to supplement educational opportunities using the tra- 
120. CREMIN, supra note 50, at 400-404, 501-509, 544-46. 
121. LaNoue, supra note 58, at 319. 
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ditional structure of education. Many of the advantages attributed 
to vouchers could be used more efficiently and be put to better use 
within the present educational structure. Sugarman has suggested 
the idea of school stamps to apply in a variety of ways to supple- 
ment educational experience.lZ2 Now is certainly not the time to 
begin anew. 
122. Sugarman, Education Reform at the Margin: Two Ideas, 59 PHI DELTA 
KAPPAN 154 (1977). 
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